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Whether measured by unemployment rates, wages, or representation at the highest 
employment levels, persistent gender imbalances exist in labor markets (see, e.g., Goldin, 1990; 
Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000; Bertrand and Hallock, 2001).
1 The intransigence 
of the observed gender differences is disturbing not only from an equity perspective, but also for 
its potential impacts on economic growth and even fertility (Galor and Weil, 1996). Several 
hypotheses have been proposed to explain why such gender inequities exist, with the weight of 
attention being paid to gender differences in human capital (Blau and Kahn, 2000), 
discrimination and stereotypes against women (Spencer et al., 1999; Goldin and Rouse, 2000), 
and expected differences in time taken out of the labor force (List and Rasul, 2010).  More 
recently, an experimental literature has emerged that reports another potential source for the
observed gender imbalance: women shy away from competitive workplaces whereas men covet, 
and even thrive in, competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007).   
The empirical foundation for this insight arises from gender and competition laboratory 
experiments.  As a brief background, such experiments typically proceed as follows.  First, the 
experimenter recruits a group of students to participate in an experiment.  Second, once situated, 
the experimenter introduces a task—solving mazes, completing math problems, tossing a ball in 
a bucket, etc.—and asks each subject to choose their preferred compensation regime.  Subjects 
                                                           
1 Blau and Kahn (2000) report that according to one index of occupational segregation by sex, 54% of all women in 
the workforce in 1997 would have to change jobs to equalize the occupational distribution of men and women.  
They note that in 1999, women were still much more concentrated than men in administrative support and service 
occupations (accounted for by 41% of the female labor force vs. 15% that of men). They also report that weekly 
earnings of female full-time workers, though they rose from 61% of men’s comparable earnings to 76.5% over 1978 
to 1999, appear to have reached a maximum in the mid-1990s at around three-quarter’s the amount of male earnings. 
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) report that among the five highest-paid positions at each of a large sample of US firms, 
only 2.5% are women, and that they earn 45% less than the men. 3
typically have a choice between either a piece rate or a tournament incentive scheme.  For 
example, under the former, the subject is paid $1 per successful attempt.  In the latter, the subject 
is paid $3 per successful attempt if she outperforms an anonymous partner, and zero otherwise.  
A stylized result that has emerged from these experiments is that men tend to prefer the 
competitive environment over the non-competitive environment whereas the opposite is true for 
women, even in tasks where women are more able.  Beyond adding a novel explanation for 
observed gender imbalances, these simple games provide insights into what might be driving 
gender differences in naturally-occurring labor markets.   
Yet, to date we do not know if such preferences manifest themselves in naturally-occurring 
settings, and if they do whether there are important economic consequences.  This is what our 
paper offers.  Stepping back from the burgeoning literature in laboratory experiments (Gneezy et 
al., 2003; Gupta et al., 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2009; Balafoutas and 
Sutter, 2010; Cason et al., 2010, Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming), we advance this line of 
research in a new direction by analyzing agents in the process of making economic choices in 
naturally occurring labor markets.  In doing so, we are able to examine directly whether the 
persisting gender gap in labor markets can be at least partly attributed to responses to 
compensation regimes characterized by varying competition and earnings uncertainty levels, two 
elements that increasingly distinguish opportunities for professional advancement and entrance 
to high-level positions (Lemieux et al., 2009). 
To test whether men and women are affected differently by reward structures characterized 
by competition and uncertainty, we conducted a natural field experiment on job-entry decisions 4
in sixteen major US cities.
2 We investigate the extent to which alternative compensation 
methods affect the proportion of female applicants to actual jobs advertised in different labor 
markets. We posted employment advertisements to an internet job-board in cities with different 
market wages and randomized interested job-seekers into different compensation regimes for the 
same jobs. The set of possible compensation regimes was identical in all cities and job-seekers 
randomly received treatments either offering fixed-wage compensation, compensation depending 
mildly on individual relative performance, compensation depending heavily on individual 
relative performance, team relative performance, or on elements of uncertainty.  Thereafter, each 
job seeker decided whether to formally apply for the position. 
In addition, we advertised two different job types. One job ad presented a job task that is 
more male-oriented, while the other is more female-oriented.  Comparing the application patterns 
for these two job ads renders it possible to clarify the relevance of task-dependence and gender-
task associations. In their seminal paper, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that gender-job 
associations are drivers of gender-specific employment patterns and predict that women sort into 
employments whose requirements match construed female attributes. Differentiating the position 
we advertise into a ‘male’ and ‘female’ version allows us to explore in the field whether the job 
task itself, gender associations surrounding the compensation regime, or interactions between 
these two, affect each gender’s response to the contract environment differently.  
With 211-690 interested job-seekers per city, a total of 6,779 subjects participated in our 
experiment.  From these job seekers, we find some intriguing data patterns.  First, we find as the 
                                                           
2 By ”natural field experiment,” we refer to the definition articulated in Harrison and List (2004): an experiment 
with a non-standard subject pool (i.e. not students), with field context in the task and information set, and where the 
subjects are naturally undertaking the tasks as part of their normal economic goings-on without knowing they are in 
an experiment . Much of the discussion on laboratory experiments can be equally applied to artefactual field 
experiments (Harrison and List), also sometimes referred to as “lab-in-the-field” experiments.5
compensation package becomes more heavily reliant on individual relative performance, the 
applicant pool shifts to be more male dominated.  In the limit, the gender gap in applications 
more than doubles when a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends on relative performance.  
This data pattern is remarkably consistent with the literature using laboratory experiments.  Yet, 
a surprising finding is that this result is not driven by men preferring competitive environments 
and women not; rather, we observe that both men and women prefer not to be in competitive 
environments, but that women simply have stronger preferences against them.   
Second, we explore several boundary conditions for our main result.  For example, gender 
differences in the preference for compensation packages that rely on relative performance are 
attenuated by several factors:  whether the task is female-oriented, if the compensation scheme is 
only mildly based on individual relative performance, and the task is completed in teams.  These
factors all lead to small and inconsequential gender differences.  Likewise, we find a link 
between gender-based differences in competitiveness and the broader economic environment.  In 
particular, we find that the gender gap in applications for competitive workplaces is correlated 
with prevailing market wages:  the gender gap is most prominent in areas with higher local 
wages.  Simply put, women are more likely to walk away from competitive workplaces if there 
are good outside options – i.e., positions with comparatively high fixed-wages—but not if these 
outside options are lacking.  
Finally, in a complementary experimental treatment, we find that uncertainty in wages alone 
cannot induce the gender gap in applications observed in the competition treatments.  More 
specifically, when job seekers face a prospective job that has wage uncertainty, both men and 
women are equally dissuaded from applying.    6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the 
experiment. Section 3 analyzes the results. Section 4 finishes with a discussion.  
2. Experimental Design 
To investigate gender differences in job-entry decisions, we conduct a natural field 
experiment using a 2 × 6 × 2 design in which we vary the employment advertisement, 
compensation scheme, and application procedure.  The design, presented in Figure 1, allows us 
to isolate the impact of the contract environment on the proportion of initially interested 
individuals who ultimately apply.  Knowing the proportion of interested job-seekers of each 
gender that remain interested upon learning the salary regime requires knowing not only the 
number of final applicants, but also the number of initially interested. We therefore employ a 
two-stage experimental method.  
As Figure 1 shows, first, we advertise the position, without reference to the compensation 
scheme.  Then, only after a job-seeker expresses interest in applying, we inform the individual of 
the compensation scheme, and record whether he or she chooses to apply for the position.
3 This
method also allows us to cleanly randomize across subjects within each city and within the same 
time period, in a manner that leaves the normalcy of the field setting undisturbed. It furthermore 
                                                           
3 A simpler approach might have been to post employment ads which included the compensation regime at the 
outset, then simply compare the ratio of male to female applicants across treatments. However, unable to post 
differing salary regimes for the same job in the same city at the same time, we would have been forced to either vary 
the salary regime across cities or post different salary regimes for the same job sequentially within the same city, 
allowing for potential temporal and spatial confounds. In addition, through this method, we would only observe job-
seekers who decide to apply after already knowing the salary scheme; the number of job-seekers who would have 
been interested in the position without knowing the compensation scheme would remain unknown. Inferences based 
on changes in absolute numbers of final applicants are much more limited. For example, using just the male/female 
application ratio without knowing the underlying gender ratio of those interested prior to knowing the compensation 
scheme is highly problematic for a variety of reasons. 7
allows us to gather individual characteristics even on those subjects who expressed interest but 
chose not to apply after they were informed about the compensation scheme. 
We posted the job ads in a total of sixteen major US metropolitan areas.
4 The cities were 
selected with the twin goals of representing a variety of geographical regions of the US which 
are characterized by different market wages and maximizing the pool of job-seekers from each 
area (all cities from which we sampled are among the top 25 most populous cities in the 
country).  The order of the ads was posted randomly across cities from January-April of 2010. 
Ads were posted on one of the most highly-frequented internet job boards in the country, and 
were always specific to a given city where we were seeking applicants.  Communication with 
subjects was through email, and every interaction was carefully scripted (see Appendix A). At
the end of the experiment, we extended job offers in every city and for each position we created. 
To date, 19 applicants have been hired. 
2.1 The employment advertisements and application procedures 
The postings advertised openings for a position as an administrative assistant, the most 
common occupation in the US.
5 We used two different versions – one ad that was for a 
“masculine” version of the job, the other for a more “feminine” version. The advertisements 
                                                           
4 The internet job-boards are city-specific. The 16 cities included in our study are Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, 
Washington DC, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, San 
Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. 
5 In 2008 and 2009, office and administrative support jobs were the most common type of position to hold, 
accounting for over 13% of the workforce each year (Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment and Earnings, January 
2010, Vol. 57(1).  Available online: http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn201001.pdf). In addition to being the most 
common job, an office support position is also very convenient for a natural field experiment. It is fairly simple to 
create administrative tasks for a subject hired into the position, and it is also quite amenable to setting up remote 
tasks that can be performed with an internet connection from different locations. One drawback to using office jobs 
is that they are disproportionately occupied by women. In 2009, 6.3% of the male labor force and 20.4% of the 
female labor force held office and administrative support occupations (Ibid.).  In 2001, 79% of administrative 
support and clerical positions were occupied by women (Gabriel and Schmidtz, “Gender Differences in 
Occupational Distributions Among Workers,” Monthly Labor Review, June 2007, Vol. 130(6), Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.) 8
were written to mirror closely other want-ads for similar positions.  Each was posted in the 
“admin/office jobs” section of the jobs website, and had three short paragraphs (see also 
Appendix A).  The first identified who we were, where we were located, and said that we were 
looking for an administrative assistant in their area to help with a project.
6 The second paragraph 
detailed the tasks for the position (preparing short reports based on news stories, and other 
typical secretarial and office/clerical skills). The third was a single sentence requesting that those 
who are interested should email their CV or resume. Requesting the job-seekers’ resumes before 
we inform them of the compensation scheme is not unusual on online job boards, and was 
necessary in order to gather agent characteristics on the full sample of subjects. The 
advertisement finished with a sign-off from a current employee of our organization, followed by 
a few brief generalities.  
Our male-oriented job-advertisement describes tasks focused around sports. The “female” ad 
is isomorphic to the “male” ad, but that its focus is general instead.
7 The text of the two ads is
identical, except for minor adjustments aimed to influence the gender distribution of interested 
job-seekers. The posting title for the male-oriented ad reads “Seeking Sports News Assistant”
and mentions a variety of pro-, semi-pro-, and college sports; while that for the female-oriented 
ad mentions nothing about sports.  In both ads, the primary task described was to create news 
digests by reading local stories and preparing short reports, in addition to other general clerical 
duties. 
                                                           
6 While not all other employers post self-identifying information, many do. We chose to explicitly identify a genuine 
organization – one with its own web pages, physical address, phone numbers, etc. – to enhance the normalcy of the 
situation and minimize any risk of suspicion. Having a genuine employee of the organization sign off the email 
added further insurance, should any job-seekers wish to do a brief internet search to verify the ad’s authenticity.
7 In a pilot, we initially tried advertising a position focused on fashion for the female version of the job, but the 
result was that almost no males applied to this job. Given that working as an administrative assistant is generally a 
female-dominated career, we felt the more general version of the ad is by itself likely to be perceived as a more 
female-oriented task. Indeed, the general version of the ad resulted in a pool of subjects the substantial majority of 
which were women. 9
Note that the only mention of compensation in the job advertisement is that the position is 
paid on an hourly basis. No information is provided at this point about the duration of the 
position, number of hours, or opportunities for growth. This enables us to capture the broadest 
possible sample of job-seekers in the area who are interested in secretarial or clerical positions. 
While some ads do explicitly detail compensation and duration, we verified that it is common for 
other employers to leave out specifics on hours and salary, so that our ads remained natural. 
Within cities, we were careful to post the male- and female-oriented ads within a short 
enough time frame of each other to avoid any possible temporal-based selection issues. Yet we 
still spaced them two days apart, intentionally allowing for many other ads to be posted to the job 
board between them, to ensure job-seekers did not mistakenly believe they were expressing 
interest in both positions when responding to only one advertisement. We posted each 
advertisement once in each city – on Monday or Wednesday, approximately 10 am local time –
randomly alternating whether the male ad or female ad came first. 
In addition to varying the gender-framing of the position by using two different ads, we 
manipulate the application procedure.  By asking job-seekers to fill out application 
questionnaires with varying lengths, we change the requested level of investment in the 
application.
8 The application questionnaires were randomized at the city level.  In eight cities, 
job-seekers had to fill out a long questionnaire with four interview questions, while in the other 
eight cities the questionnaire was short and contained only one question (see Appendix A). 
                                                           
8 Employers often use self-selection devices to sort out better suited applicants (Spence, 1973; Salop and Salop, 
1976). We implemented this commonly used device in our experiment by manipulating the effort needed to 
complete an application. 10
2.2 The compensation scheme treatments 
Within each of the two jobs in a given city, we randomized job-seekers who expressed 
interest in the position into one of six different treatments. The characteristics of the treatments 
are summarized in Table 1 and the scripts are listed in Appendix A. Subjects were not given the 
treatment until after they had already expressed interest in the job, and they received the 
treatment within 24 hours of expressing this interest. The first two treatments use the same 
compensation scheme, a fixed-wage of $15 an hour, but differ in whether the job is done in 
teams (T1) or alone (T2). These two treatments serve as our primary control group, against 
which we compare behavior of job-seekers under the alternative compensation schemes. 
The next two treatments T3 and T4 consist of individual tournament-based salary regimes.
9
The difference between the two is that T3 has a relatively low competition-based reward, 
whereas T4 has a much higher one. We tell the job-seeker she will be matched with another 
person we are currently hiring into the same position, and that whichever of the two performs 
better earns a bonus. For the individual tournament-low treatment T3, the base salary is $13.50
an hour and the bonus is equivalent to $3 an hour. The worker thus earns $13.50 an hour or 
$16.50 an hour, depending on how she performs with respect to her co-coworker. For the 
individual-high treatment T4, the base salary is $12 an hour, with a bonus equal to $6 an hour for 
the most productive worker. So the worker earns $12 an hour or $18 an hour, depending on 
relative performance. Dividing the individual relative performance pay scheme into a high 
competition treatment and low competition treatment helps provide a rough measure of the 
                                                           
9 Other employers offering similar jobs on this job board also sometimes use compensation schemes involving 
bonuses. However, as an added measure to preserve the normalcy of the economic environment, we added language 
to the non-standard compensation treatments to explain the nature of the contract. For example, we included the 
sentence, “We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality information from you is important.” The intention here 
was to provide a natural rationale for why we might want to encourage competition among employees. In addition, 
for the two team treatments (team-hourly, and team-tournament), we added the sentence “As the work is best done 
in teams, you will be paired with one co-worker.”11
elasticity of the gender gap in competitiveness, and the sensitivity of each gender’s response to 
different intensities of competition.  
The fifth treatment T5, group-based competition, places two new hires into a team, and 
makes their compensation contingent on the group’s relative performance with respect to another 
similarly composed team. The base payment ($12) and bonus ($6) in this compensation scheme 
are as in T4. We selected the highly competitive incentive for this treatment in order to intensify 
any effect, and to render possible comparisons to treatment T4. 
The final treatment aims to capture the gender difference in attitudes towards uncertainty 
over job compensation.  We tell subjects their work contributes to the possibility of journal 
publication; then, we inform them the base salary for the position is $13.50 per hour, plus a 
bonus that translates to $3 per hour if their assistance contributes to journal article publications.
10
Just as in the competition treatments, there is uncertainty over the payment and the worker is 
allowed to believe she has the ability to influence the outcome through her own labor.  In 
contrast to the competition treatments, however, she is not performing against anyone else.  
Note that the mean payoff for all six salary regimes is identical ($15 an hour). The treatments 
were communicated via emails. All job-seekers expressing interest in the job received an email. 
All the emails contained exactly the same text, except the few lines describing compensation (see 
Appendix A). We thanked the job-seeker for their interest in the position, let them know 
everyone who contacted us about the job was receiving a general initial email from us with basic 
                                                           
10 We were careful to emphasize the clerical role of the position to subjects, and to clarify that they would merely be 
providing administrative assistance.  This was to ensure that job-seekers did not think they were applying for a 
position where they might be involved in the actual writing of publications. We should note that it is conceivable 
that the pure uncertainty treatment T6 also introduces an additional meaning to the work that is not present in the 
other treatments, if subjects in the other treatments did not understand that their work led to the potential publication 
of articles.  However, there is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence we are aware of that would lead us to 
expect that this marginal adjustment to the meaning of the task should alter the gender distributions—i.e., that there 
is a gender/task/treatment interaction.  Nevertheless, we urge the reader to keep this in mind when interpreting data 
from treatment T6. 12
information, and included the treatment-specific script.  At this point, subjects were still unaware 
of the job’s duration and number of hours per week.
11
2.3 The response variable and job-seeker characteristics 
The key variable of interest is the individual decision of whether or not to apply, once the 
compensation method is known. Every individual who contacted us to express interest in the job 
constitutes a ‘subject’ in our experiment.  In order to actually apply, however, the interested job-
seeker had to fill out the interview questionnaire and send it back to us.
12 We therefore classify 
all subjects who returned the questionnaire to us as having applied, and those who did not return 
the questionnaire as having not applied. 
Using internet-based job applications presents a minor challenge in determining the gender of 
subjects, since it cannot be visually observed.  In addition, directly asking a subject’s gender (i.e. 
via email) has important legal implications, and might seem unnatural and disrupt the normalcy 
of the field setting.  Further, directly asking for gender could have altered the subject’s decision 
of whether or not to apply.   
In order to determine gender, we use each subject’s first name and employ a three-tier 
method.  The vast majority of names are assigned gender based on probabilities derived from the 
                                                           
11 They are informed of these details at the time we offer the job, at which point they decide whether to accept it. We 
were careful in the emails to create an environment open to questions, apologizing for any questions about the job 
they may have asked to which we have not responded, and welcoming further inquiries. We could not interact with 
subjects before they received the salary regime information and made their choice about applying for the job without 
risking heterogeneous treatment. Yet by creating an environment welcome to inquiries, we minimize the possibility 
that job-seekers feel jilted or ignored, which might have a (gender-dependent) effect on their propensity to apply. 
12 This is made clear in the treatment email describing compensation, where we indicate that returning the 
questionnaire completes their application. In the rare cases where a subject sent us a second email of interest in the 
position (i.e. after receiving our email describing the salary regime) without filling out the questionnaire, we emailed 
them a reminder that their application is not complete until we receive the questionnaire. 13
Social Security Administration (SSA) database on name popularity by gender and birth year.
13
For any names which are not included in the SSA database, we use an additional database 
created by Geoff Peters (available at http://www.gpeters.com/names/baby-names.php) which
calculates gender ratios by first name, using the internet to analyze patterns of name-usage for 
over 100,000 first names.
14 This second database is also used as an additional check on the SSA-
based assignments in cases where the gender ratio derived from the SSA database is too low to 
confidently assign one gender or the other.  Finally, for all names where neither database yields a
large enough gender ratio to make a confident assignment, we perform internet searches for 
gender identifiers of the actual subjects themselves, e.g., by finding the subjects on social 
networking websites. 
The remaining individual characteristics of interest were gathered from the resumes sent to 
us by the subjects. These include level of education, job experience (i.e., whether job-seeker has 
already worked as administrative assistant), and age.  
                                                           
13 We use the SSA database to calculate, for each name, a weighted gender probability. The database reports figures 
on the most common 1,000 names for men and the most common 1,000 names for women born in any given year. 
We take a given name, proceed to use the number of men and women born each year with that name, and then create 
a gender ratio for that name in each given year. We then look across multiple years to create a weighted average of 
this gender ratio. We first restrict our range to birth years 1944-1993, so as to focus on the most likely birth years of 
our subjects. Then, since information in the CVs suggests the majority of our subjects are between 22 and 30 years 
old, we assign lower weights to birth years earlier than 1979 and later than 1987.  The weights diminish as birth-
years move further from those of the 22-30 year-old bracket.  We do this for each name that appears in our sample. 
If the resulting first name-based weighted probability of being female is larger than 50%, we define the subject as a 
woman. Otherwise, we define the subject as a man. Note that there are very few names for which gender cannot be 
inferred accurately. For example, in our sample of job-seekers only 0.8% of the subjects have names with gender 
ratios less than 2:1, and only 4.8% have a ratio less than 10:1. 
14 For names included in both databases, the Gpeters database generates gender ratios very close to the ratios 
generated by the SSA database (r=0.89, p<0.0001, Pearson). 14
3. Experimental Results 
We start with a descriptive overview (Section 3.1) and proceed to present the overall 
application patterns in the compensation scheme treatments (Section 3.2).  Thereafter, we 
examine determinants of the gender-specific application probabilities (Section 3.3).  This section 
concludes with an investigation of gender-specific individual characteristics in the compensation 
scheme treatments (Section 3.4).
3.1 Descriptive overview 
In total, we collected data from 6,779 individuals who responded to one of the two job 
advertisements.  The gender from 5,666 individuals (83.6%) was assigned using the SSA 
database.  The Geoff Peters database was used to assign gender to 506 individuals (7.5%), and 
the internet search allowed us to assign gender to 512 individuals (7.6%).
15 Table 2 provides 
detailed information on the number of observations in each cell of our 2 × 6 × 2 design and 
application probabilities for selected categories.  Table 3 provides information about the sixteen 
cities where the advertisements were placed, including the number of observations and 
application probabilities in each location.  While 4,239 individuals responded to the female ad, 
2,540 responded to the male ad.  Of these interested job-seekers, 2,702 individuals ultimately 
applied for one of our jobs – 1,566 for the female and 1,136 for the male advertisement. This 
represents approximately 40% of the job seekers in our sample (33%–48% of the subjects in 
each city).  
                                                           
15 The application patterns reported in this paper are not subject to the inclusion of the gender identifiers from the 
Geoff Peters database or the gender identifiers from the internet search. We excluded from the analysis 37
individuals for whom we could not identify gender. There were also 231 individuals who responded to both job 
advertisements. For these individuals, we only consider their application decision with respect to the job 
advertisement to which they responded first. Further, we had to exclude 48 individuals due to technical problems 
during the e-mail exchange. 15
As expected, the female advertisement attracts a higher proportion of females than the male 
advertisement. While 53.5% of the job-seekers who expressed interest in the male advertisement 
are women, 80.3% of the job-seekers for the female advertisement are women which represents a 
significant difference at the p < .01 level using a Fisher’s exact test.
16 The length of the 
application questionnaire does not significantly affect application probabilities: 40.6% of the job-
seekers apply if the questionnaire is short and 39% if the questionnaire is long (Fisher’s exact 
test, p=0.188). Yet, the questionnaire length does appear to significantly affect application costs. 
Applicants respond to the long questionnaire with roughly three times the writing output as that 
for the short questionnaire (long questionnaire applicants use 338 words on average, while short 
questionnaire applicants use an average of 117 words , T-test, p<0.0001). 
3.2 Overall application patterns in the compensation scheme treatments 
Figure 2 illustrates the mean overall application probabilities for women and men for each of 
the six compensation treatments.  We first note that, conditional on expressing initial interest in 
the job, men are in general more likely to apply:  the overall application probability for men is 
0.484, significantly higher than for women, who apply with a 0.362 probability (Fisher exact 
test, p<0.0001).  Second, note that the difference between the application probabilities of men 
and women is most pronounced in the high-competition treatment T4, where men are 55.5%
more likely to apply than women (0.485 for men versus 0.312 for women, Fisher exact test, 
                                                           
16 The proportion of women responding to our ad that removes male-oriented language is very close to the 
percentage of office support jobs actually occupied by women – 79% in 2001, according to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The close parallel between expressed interest and realized outcomes suggests a strong relationship 
between gender distributions in the workforce and gender distributions among applicants. This underscores the 
importance of contract-induced changes in application patterns for realized composition of workers in the labor 
force. 16
p<0.0001).  In the competition treatment, T3, in which compensation depends less heavily on 
relative performance than in T4, men are 36.4% more likely to apply than women.  
In the team competition treatment, T5, men’s application probability is 31.9% higher, in the 
uncertainty treatment, T6, it is 32.5% higher.  In the two baseline treatments T1 (team-fixed) and 
T2 (individual-fixed), the probability that males apply is 23.1% and 26.5% higher than females’ 
probabilities.  Appendix B, Figure A, illustrates the application patterns for each city separately. 
Table 4 shows the application probability for each gender depending on the compensation 
scheme, job advertisement, and application procedure.  These data patterns lead to our first 
result: 
Result 1: Competitive workplaces significantly increase the gender gap in application 
probabilities, as women’s propensity to apply substantially drops relative to that of men. 
For further evidence of this result, we consider a Logit regression model in which we regress 
the application decision on all possible interactions between treatments × gender.  Table 5 
reports the results. The regressions control for location fixed effects and the coefficients reported 
are marginal effects.  The reference group for the regressions is composed of women in 
treatments T1 and T2.  We pool the two baseline treatments, as the application probabilities and 
patterns in T1 and T2 are very similar, suggesting these two compensation schemes were 
perceived as virtually the same.
17  In Appendix, Table A, we provide regression analyses 
showing that our findings hold if we do not pool data from treatments T1 and T2.  Appendix,
                                                           
17 Recall that the compensation structure is in fact identical across these two treatments. The only difference between 
T1 and T2 was in the framing of the job as individual or teamwork-based.  17
Table B, includes a robustness check where we control for subjects’ education, job experience, 
and other potential covariates, none of which affect the application patterns. 
Table 5 indicates whether the gender gap in application probabilities in treatments T3 
through T6 significantly differs from the gender gap in the two fixed-wage baseline treatments 
under several different specifications.  Model 1 uses the full sample from both job 
advertisements and both types of questionnaires.  We find in this model that the coefficient on 
the interaction T4 × male is positive, and significant at the p=0.064 level using a two-sided 
alternative, or p=0.032 using the one-sided alternative suggested by the literature. That is, as we 
hold everything but the payment regime constant, the amount by which men are more likely to 
apply than women substantially increases as we move from the baseline to compensation that 
depends heavily on individual relative performance.  Such contracts make women significantly 
less likely than men to apply. While the average marginal effect of being male on propensity to 
apply in the fixed-wage treatments T1&T2 is 0.106, the effect of being male under T4 increases 
by 0.07. That is, T4 widens the gender gap in propensity to apply by almost 70%.  We dig a level 
deeper into the data to find that: 
Result 2:  This gap is not driven by men opting to compete and women opting not to compete, 
but rather by a significantly stronger aversion to competitive workplaces among women than 
among men.  
Figure 2 suggests that women and men both prefer non-competitive workplaces, as 
application probabilities drop for both genders when moving from fixed-wage compensation (T1 
& T2) to compensation depending on relative performance (T3 & T4). The estimated coefficients 18
for the treatment dummies T3–T6 in Table 5 show the changes in women’s application 
probabilities in each of the four treatments T3–T6, as compared to the baseline treatments.  
Several insights follow. 
First, note that all coefficients for the four treatment dummies are significantly negative and 
range in magnitude from -0.068 (T6) to -0.127 (T5). That is, women are significantly less likely 
to apply for jobs in which compensation is not fixed. In particular, the probability that women 
apply in T4 is 0.117 lower as compared to treatments T1 and T2, which represents a 27.3% drop 
in application probability.  
If we focus on men in treatments T1 and T2 as the reference group for the regressions, we 
see that men are also less likely to apply for jobs in which compensation is not fixed, but that
they generally react less strongly than women (see Appendix Table C).  Just as for women, 
men’s application probabilities decrease in treatments T3-T6 as compared to the baseline 
T1&T2, yet the reductions are smaller than for women.  In particular, for T4, the estimated 
average marginal effect suggests an average drop of only 8.8% in application probability from 
the baseline (-0.047, p=0.130).
We thus observe on the one hand that contracts characterized by relative performance-based 
pay tend to have a dissuasive effect on both genders, while on the other hand that the effect is 
substantially stronger for women. The gender gap induced by competition-based contracts is thus 
driven by the fact that women are more deterred from applying by competitive compensation 
regimes than are men. This suggests a more nuanced mechanism may be at play in naturally 
occurring labor markets than the stylized result that has emerged from the rich literature in lab 
experiments, in which men are often observed to be attracted to competition while women shy 
away from such environments. 19
3.3 Determinants of the gender gap  
In this section, we explore boundary conditions of our main result.  This exploration aids in 
helping us understand the causes of the observed deviations in application probabilities as well as 
the factors that attenuate and exacerbate the deviations.  A first result emerges: 
Result 3:  Several factors related to the workplace affect the gender gap, including: i) the degree 
to which compensation depends on relative performance, ii) whether the job is team based, and 
iii) the nature of the job task.
We observe a substantial attenuation of the effect of competitive workplaces on the gender 
gap as we lessen the intensity of the competition incentive from 50% (treatment T4) of the base 
wage to 22% (treatment T3).  In Table 5, we see that the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
T3 × male drops to approximately one-third of the magnitude of the coefficient on T4 × male; 
although it remains positive, it becomes insignificant at conventional levels (average marginal 
effect of 0.022, p=0.555).  That is, ceteris paribus, changing the contract from a fixed wage to 
compensation mildly dependent on individual relative performance has no significant impact on 
the gender gap in application probabilities.  
We also find that adjusting the relative performance contract to make it team-based reduces 
the gender gap considerably.  Table 5 shows that the coefficient on the interaction T5 × male is 
small in magnitude and insignificant (p=0.937). Recall that under T5, the bonus raises the wage 
from $12 to $18, just as for T4, but that in T5 workers are evaluated on the joint performance of 
their team. Thus, while the gender gap in application probabilities significantly increases when 20
moving from a fixed hourly wage (T1&T2) to one heavily dependent on individual relative 
performance (T4), the gap remains constant when moving from a fixed wage to a wage heavily 
dependent on team relative performance (T5).  
To examine whether and how the nature of the job task affects the gender gap induced by 
relative performance pay, we investigate gender differences in application probabilities for each 
of the two job advertisements separately. We start with the male job advertisement.  Figure 3 
replicates Figure 2 but restricts the data summary to the male job advertisement.  As before, we
observe that among individuals expressing initial interest in the job, men are more likely to 
ultimately apply than women.  This is true across all six treatments:  the mean application 
probability being 0.534 for men and 0.372 for women, a significant difference at the p < .01 level 
using a Fisher exact test.  Yet, note the striking difference of probabilities in T4, compared to the 
other five treatments.  The gender gap is similar in T1, T2, T3, T5, and T6 (0.109–0.172), where 
the probability that men apply ranges from 32.8% to 50.8% higher than that for women.  It is
considerably more pronounced in T4 (0.281; application probability women = 0.298, men = 
0.579), where the probability that men apply is 94% higher than it is for women.  This represents 
a very strong gender effect  in moving from initially interested job-seekers to those who actually 
apply upon learning the compensation regime. While for every man who signalled interest in the 
male-oriented job there are 1.13 women who signalled interest, in T4 there are only 0.58 women 
that ultimately applied for every man that applied. 
Model 2 in Table 5 is identical to Model 1, with the exception that it is restricted to responses 
for the male job advertisement.  Empirical results are qualitatively similar to Model 1, which 
uses the full sample. The treatment dummies show that women are significantly less likely to 
apply in T3-T6 as compared to the baseline, and the male dummy indicates that the application 21
probability is 0.124 higher for men in the baseline. As in Model 1, all treatment × gender 
interactions are insignificant (p>0.445) besides T4 × male. Note that now, however, the 
coefficient on T4 × male more than doubles in magnitude and substantially increases in 
significance.  The difference-in-difference in application probabilities in moving from the fixed 
hourly wages to the strong individual competition treatment is now 0.153, and significant at the 
p<.01 level using a two-sided alternative.   
Importantly, this result shows that when we restrict the sample to the male job-task and hold 
everything but the payment regime constant, the gender gap in application probabilities observed 
in the baseline T1 and T2 (0.124) increases by approximately 125% when compensation depends 
heavily on individual relative performance. 
Figure 4 is identical to Figure 3, but now shows only the application probabilities for the 
female job advertisement. We observe again that, conditional on expressing initial interest in the 
job, men are generally more likely to apply, but that the difference in overall application rates is 
much smaller than for the male ad (application probability of men= 0.414, application 
probability of women= 0.358; Fisher exact test, p=0.003). We also see that the gender gap in 
application probabilities is quite similar across all six treatments.  The smallest gender difference 
is in T4 (0.021) and the largest in T2 (0.072).  In none of the six treatments are women 
significantly less likely to apply than men (p>0.107).  
Model 3 in Table 5 is identical to Model 1, with the exception that it is restricted to responses 
to the female job advertisement. The results are similar to Models 1 and 2, with one crucial 
exception. As in Models 1 and 2, the coefficients on the treatment dummies show that women 
are significantly less likely to apply in treatments T3-T6 as compared to the baseline. Also, the 
male dummy is significant at conventional levels, suggesting that men who expressed initial 22
interest in the advertisement are more likely to apply in the baseline as compared to women. 
However, turning to the treatment × gender interactions, we now see that none of the coefficients 
are significant (p>0.525). That is, none of the treatments significantly alter the gender gap in 
propensity to apply among job-seekers interested in the female-oriented position. The T4 × male 
interaction is now small and insignificant (p=0.555): the gender gap in application probabilities 
caused by the strong competition incentive has vanished for female based jobs.  
A closer look at the data reveals that the disappearance of the gender gap in T4 as we move 
from the male ad to the female ad is driven mostly by a large drop in the fraction of men who 
ultimately apply, but also partly by an increase in the fraction of women applying.  Among men, 
the application probability is similar when moving from the baseline to T4 under the male ad 
(estimated change=0.006, p=0.879), but it significantly drops (by 0.139; p=0.005) when moving 
from the baseline to T4 under the female ad.  Among women, the application probability 
decreases by 0.147 when moving from the baseline to treatment T4 under the male ad, but drops 
by only 0.104 when moving from the baseline to treatment T4 under the female ad.  That is, 
while men are largely unaffected and women severely dissuaded by treatment T4 under the male 
ad, both genders are dissuaded by treatment T4 from applying under the female ad (though 
women less than under the male ad). Thus, we find that when switching the framing of the job 
from male- to female-oriented, men switch from being indifferent to strong individual 
competition to being deterred by it, while women become less deterred by it, causing the gender 
gap to disappear.  Moving to treatment T6, we find a further result: 23
Result 4: Uncertainty alone is insufficient to cause the gender gap: wage contracts that impose 
pure uncertainty on workers’ compensation have an equally dissuasive effect on applications 
from both women and men. 
Turning our attention to treatment T6, we find that when compensation depends purely on 
uncertain elements, the effect on application probabilities is negative.  Recall that in T6, the 
worker is not in competition with anyone else, but does receive a bonus if a particular outcome 
occurs.  Model 1 of Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficient on the dummy for T6 is -0.068
(p=0.001).  However, the coefficient on the gender-treatment interaction T6 × male is small and 
insignificant (p=0.749). That is, we find no evidence of a gender-dependent response to purely 
uncertain compensation, as the gender gap does not change in moving from the baseline 
treatments to T6.  Holding everything but the contract constant, moving from fixed-wage to 
uncertain compensation reduces the propensity to apply by an average of 6.8% for women and 
5.6% for men (Table C).
An additional piece of speculative evidence that speaks to uncertainty as an explanation for 
the gender gap in competitive workplaces comes from the comparison of T4, where 
compensation depends heavily on individual relative performance, and T5, where compensation 
depends heavily on team relative performance. While the variance in potential wages is constant 
between T4 and T5, the level of uncertainty is arguably lower in T4 than in T5, as in T4 there is 
no uncertainty about the performance of the subject’s team member. Thus, were uncertainty to be 
an important driver of the gender gap in T4, we would observe a larger gender gap in T5. 
However, this is at odds with the actual pattern of the data, which in fact shows no gender gap in 
T5.24
We are now in a position to move to an analysis of how the economic environment affects 
application patterns.  Placing our employment advertisements in multiple cities enables us to 
explore the link between: i) the gender-dependent responses to different contract-types we 
observe in our data; and ii) local labor market conditions. Our subjects come from sixteen 
different labor markets, all of which differ in their market hourly wages. To obtain precise 
estimates of prevailing local wages, we collected data on the median hourly wages from 
comparable administrative assistant jobs posted on the same online job board, for positions 
which offered fixed-wage compensation. The median wage levels we observe in these data range 
from $10 -$14 per hour across the sixteen different cities. While lower than the most recent 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on mean compensation for administrative office jobs (ranging in 
the same cities from $14.99-$20.03 in May 2009), the two data sets for wages of jobs 
comparable to the one we advertised are highly correlated (r=0.914, p<0.0001). 
There are reasons to expect that local wage levels may affect the gender difference in 
willingness to enter workplaces where compensation depends on competition and uncertain 
outcomes. When women have fewer (or less attractive) outside options to work in a job with 
fixed wages,  i.e. when market wages are comparatively low, they may be less reluctant to enter 
competitive workplaces – even if they dislike competing. This leads us to our next result: 
Result 5: Market wages are critically linked to the gender gap:  as wages rise towards our 
offered wage, women are disproportionately deterred from applying to the competitive job.  
To provide evidence of this result, we estimate the average marginal effects of the treatment 
× gender interactions for each city separately, controlling for job experience, education, and job 25
task.  We then examine the relationship between these estimated effects and the median wage 
levels in each location. Figure 5 provides an initial look at this relationship by comparing wage 
levels to the size of the gender gap in application probabilities under the strong competition 
incentive (i.e. the T4 × male interactions).  
Figure 5 suggests a positive relationship between the T4 × male interactions and the cities’ 
hourly market wage.  For example, the three cities with the highest wage levels in our sample 
(San Francisco, Boston, and Washington DC) are also the cities with highly positive estimates of 
the T4 × male interactions. Note that in these cities median wages are at least $13, and they are 
the closest to the mean wage that we offer of $15. The figure also shows that the relationship 
between the T4 × male interactions and the cities’ hourly market wage is less clear in cities 
where the wage levels are low.  Only six out of thirteen cities have a positive T4 × male 
coefficient. Overall there is a positive correlation between market wages and T4 × male 
interactions (r = 0.554, p=0.026, Pearson).  
To more rigorously test whether application patterns are subject to market wages, we divide 
the sample into one group consisting of the three cities where wages are most comparable to the 
wage we offer, and another group where wages are considerably lower. Appendix Table D 
reports results from the regression using only the first group. We find that among these cities the 
gender gap in T4 is strong and statistically significant (model 1).  Turning to the job task, when 
we restrict our focus to the sample of subjects expressing interest in the male advertisement 
(model 2 of Table D), we observe that the T4 × male interaction is the only significant 
interaction (p=0.023); all other treatment × gender interactions are insignificant at conventional 
levels (p>0.228).  Appendix Table E reports results from the second group cities.  We now 
observe that the overall T4 × male interaction is no longer significant (p=0.438, model 1). 26
However, it is still significant at p=0.066 for the male job advertisement sample (model 2). None 
of the other treatments interact significantly with gender in the thirteen cities where market 
wages are lower (i.e., below $13).  
As a robustness test on the extent to which each treatment’s effect on the gender gap in 
applications depends on local wages, we estimate the predictive power of the wage on the change 
in the gap in each treatment controlling for other potential covariates. Table 6 reports results 
from an OLS model where we use the cities’ hourly market wage to predict the treatment × male 
average marginal effects in each location, controlling for the cities’ unemployment rate, supply 
of comparable jobs, and application questionnaire length. In Model 3, we see that market wage 
positively predicts the effects of the T4 × male interactions in each city at the p < .05 level. Table 
6 also shows the predictive power of local wages on the marginal effects on the gender gap of 
treatments other than T4.  Market wages are insignificant predictors for T1&T2 × male, T3 ×
male, and T5 × male, and do predict the T6 × male interaction (p=0.005).
We also observe in Table 6 that the application questionnaire length does not significantly 
affect any of the treatment × male interactions (p>0.453). Recall that the application 
questionnaire length was randomized at the city level. Models 4 and 5 in Table 5 seem to suggest 
that the application questionnaire could itself play an important role for the T4 × male 
interaction, which is significant if the questionnaire is short (model 4) but insignificant if the 
questionnaire is long (model 5). However, model 3 in Table 6 suggests that the apparent 
relevance of the application questionnaire for the gender gap is in fact substantially driven by 
other city level variables that co-vary with the questionnaire length. In particular, market wages 
seem to explain the apparent importance of the application questionnaire for the gender gap 
observed in Table 5. If we were to use only application questionnaire length in model 3 of Table 27
6, then it would be significant (p=0.069, not shown), but upon controlling for market wages, the 
application questionnaire length becomes insignificant.  
3.4 The gender gap and individual characteristics 
Individuals who responded to our job advertisements are of varying ages (mean = 27.9 years, 
approximately two-thirds are 22-30 years, min. = 18, max. = 68),
18 and have a range of different
educational backgrounds and work experience. For  example,  44.9%  of the applicants have a 
bachelor’s degree and 57.4% have had at least some college. The majority of applicants has 
experience as an administrative assistant (variable: job experience, 70.5 percent). 
In Table B in the appendix, we control for education and job experience in our main 
regression models.  We find that both variables are significant predictors for the decision to 
apply (job experience is associated with lower likelihood of applying, more education with 
higher likelihood), but that our main findings are not affected by including them in the 
regressions despite the fact that our female subjects are more likely to have job experience and 
are less educated than our male subjects (p<0.001).  
Comparing these two attributes across those job-seekers which select into each compensation 
method (i.e. those who choose to apply under each treatment), we find no statistically significant 
differences.  Neither mean job experience (Kruskal-Wallis equality of populations rank test, 
p=0.535) nor mean education (p=0.117) are statistically different across the six groups of 
applicants in T1-T6.  Moreover, if we regress job experience or education on treatments, gender, 
                                                           
18 We did not ask participants for their age but instead derived the age from information on the individuals’ CVs 
such as their graduation year. We could infer the age only from 4620 of our 6779 subjects. While controlling for age 
decreases the sample size, we do not find that it affects application patterns. In general, we observe that older 
subjects are less likely to apply. 28
and the treatment × gender interactions, none of the coefficients on the interactions are 
significant.
Job experience and education are arguably imprecise indicators of the qualifications of job-
seekers for our particular jobs.  Thus, they may not satisfactorily reveal whether the sample of 
applicants differs in relevant abilities between our treatments.  To amend for this shortcoming, 
we make use of the questionnaire responses in the applications and investigate their 
informational content.  Recall that when subjects replied to the questionnaires, subjects already 
knew the salary scheme, and that by sending us their response they were choosing to apply. We 
therefore have questionnaire responses only for those subjects who chose to become applicants.  
We had four independent auditors (two women and two men), blind to the project, 
treatments, and the gender of the applicants (we removed all identifiers of gender from the 
responses) rank applicants according to the “applicants’ ability to perform the advertised job 
tasks”.
19 Each auditor evaluated in total 400 application questionnaires which were randomly 
drawn from the full sample and differed in applicant’s gender and compensation scheme 
(whether application was for the fixed wage treatments T1/T2 or the individual competition 
treatments T3 and T4). Moreover, auditors rated how confident the applicants perceive 
themselves to perform the job.
20 From this exercise comes our last result: 
                                                           
19 The ranked ability to perform the job tasks correlates significantly with the applicants’ job experience (r=0.083, 
p=0.001) and education (r=0.153, p<0.001). Job applicants are better ranked, if they have job experience and a 
higher level of education. 
20 Gender differences in (over-) confidence may be a potential source of gender differences in competitiveness 
(Barber and Odean, 2001). While perhaps less direct than other approaches to evaluating self-confidence, the virtue 
of this method lies in keeping the job application process as natural and as similar to typical applications as possible, 
which was of critical importance to us. In addition, we had two more questions related more indirectly to ability 
(“Would you hire the applicant?” and “How well does the applicant answer the question?”). We do not report the 
analysis of these two questions because they lead to qualitatively very similar findings to those for the direct 
question about the applicants’ ability. 29
Result 6. Men of low abilities are over-proportionally attracted by wage compensation schemes 
that depend heavily on individual relative performance.  
Figure 6 illustrates gender-specific sorting according to abilities into the different 
compensation environments controlling for rater fixed effects and confidence.  We see that the 
mean ability of women slightly increases as competition is introduced.  In T1 and T2, 42.7% of 
the female applicants are classified as ‘able’ or ‘very able’, in treatment T3 this percentage is 
50.9%, and in treatment T4 it is 54.7%.  This pattern is very different for men.  For men, ability 
increases from treatments T1 and T2 to T3, but sharply decreases when competition is 
intensified.  For example, in treatment T4, only 37.3% of the male applicants are classified as 
‘able’ or ‘very able’ whereas the corresponding percentage is 48.8% in treatments T1 and T2 and 
54.7% in treatment T3. 
Model 1 in Appendix B Table F shows the formal statistical results underlying Figure 6. The 
dependent variable is the applicants’ rated ability to perform the advertised job.  For simplicity, 
we categorized the responses into two categories: (i) ‘not able’ (consisting of the responses ‘not 
able’, chosen in 11.6% of the cases, and the response ‘somewhat able’ which was chosen in 
40.7% of the cases) and  (ii) ‘able’ (categories ‘able’: 39% and ‘very able’: 8.7%).
21 We find 
that the drop in men’s abilities from treatments T1 and T2 to T4 is significant at the p=0.024 
level (model 1, T4 dummy).  Moreover, we observe that the T4 × female interaction is highly 
significant and positive, confirming the gender gap in rated abilities in the compensation 
environment where wages depend heavily on individual relative performance. 
                                                           
21 The findings are not subject to this categorization. 30
Finally, model 2 in Table F indicates that there is no gender-specific sorting into treatment 
T4. The dependent variable in this model is the rater’s perceived level of confidence from the 
job-applicants. We neither observe that these confidence levels significantly change for men 
when moving from treatments T1 and T2 to T4 (p=0.511), nor that there is an interaction 
between treatment T4 and gender (p=0.429). This means it is unlikely that gender differences in 
confidence are what is driving the gender gap induced by the compensation scheme where wages 
depend heavily on individual relative performance.  This result provides an important insight into 
why we might be observing the gender differences we observe in labor markets.  More research 
is necessary on this point, however, as confidence might be measured with error.    
4. Discussion 
A pillar of economics is that incentives matter.  The sociology and management literatures 
have long studied the role of both financial and non-financial incentives within firms and 
organizations.  The seminal contract theory work of Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and the 
proliferation of personnel economics (Lazear 1995) has helped to usher such incentive questions 
into the mainstream of labor economics. 
Our research takes this broader literature into a different direction to explore how the 
compensation scheme influences worker sorting.  An earlier generation of empirical studies 
exploited firm’s personnel data to measure the productivity effects of compensation schemes on 
individual workers (see List and Rasul 2010, for a review).  An econometric challenge facing 
these studies is that observed incentive contracts are endogenously determined (Prendergast 
1999, Chiappori and Salanie 2003).  This means that identifying causal effects of incentives on 
behavior is confounded by the presence of unobservables, such as managerial practices or31
workplace amenities, that determine both which compensation schemes are chosen, and worker 
productivity.  In earlier research relying on cross-sectional variation this concern has been 
addressed using instrumental variables (Groves et al., 1994).  However, this concern applies even 
if such effects are identified purely from within firm observations (Jones and Kato, 1995; 
Ichniowski et al., 1997; Paarsch and Shearer, 1999 & 2000; Lazear, 2000). 
Field experiments introduce exogenously timed variation in incentive structures that are 
orthogonal to other management practices or workplace amenities.  This provides us with the 
opportunity to identify the causal impact of compensation regimes on the behavior of individual 
job seekers.  In this way, our study extends a rich literature on gender-based behavioral 
differences in several meaningful ways.  First, by taking the experiment to the field we are 
provided with a glimpse of whether, and to what extent, gender preferences influence the first 
stage of the hiring decision.  As our subjects do not know that they are being experimentally 
observed, we remove the risk that their choices are influenced by experimenter expectations, 
heightened sensitivity to gender norms, or other similar threats to causal interpretation. Second, 
by randomly varying the compensation scheme faced by an individual who has already 
expressed interest in a job, we isolate the impact of the salary regime on the gender balance of 
applicants, which is likely to influence gender composition of employees.  In doing so, we find 
that women are generally more sensitive to divergences from fixed-wage compensation.  In 
particular, we find that competitive workplaces can in fact significantly decrease the propensity 
of women to apply for a job compared to that of men.  
Complementary treatments provide important boundary conditions for this result, however.  
For instance, while the dissuasive effect of competition-based compensation on women can be
strong and significant when stakes of the competition are on the order of 50% of base-wage, the 32
effect substantially diminishes when the stakes of relative performance drop to 22% of the base-
wage.  In addition, including a team element to the competitive environment, such that 
compensation depends on the relative performance of a group of workers to which one belongs 
can considerably attenuate the gender gap.  
Whether competition disproportionately discourages women from applying to a job also 
appears to heavily depend on the job-task and possibly the gender norms surrounding the task. 
Among job-seekers interested in the “female” ad, which redefines the job-task so as to remove 
associations with activities that may be construed as “male,” neither of the competition 
treatments changes the gender balance among applicants.  This result suggests that previous 
findings regarding gender differences in preferences for competition are based at least in part on 
the nature of the task performed.  In field settings, when economic agents are faced with choices 
regarding job-selection, the nature of the work matters. Therefore, descriptive framing of the jobs 
and their potential gender associations may play a key role in the ultimate sorting of workers.  
We also find that broader market conditions play a crucial role in gender-dependent 
responses to highly competitive workplaces. The gender gap induced by high competition 
incentives is critically linked to the local labor market.  For instance, we find that women are 
most likely to be deterred from competitive work environments when viable outside options are 
available.  This suggests that women are responding appropriately to ‘prices,’ in the sense that 
they are trading off lower fixed wages with more competitive job environments. 
Complementary analysis offers some suggestive evidence as to the causal mechanism driving 
the gender gap observed. Readily observable characteristics such as education and job-
experience appear to have no effect on how an individual responds to different contract 
environments; however, a blind analysis of the quality of interview questionnaire responses 33
suggests that the highly competitive regime disproportionately attracts low-ability males.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that “males compete too much” – i.e., more than what would 
maximize monetary payoffs (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). 
In closing, some words of caution are in order.  First, it is important to recognize that we have 
chosen a specific type of job in our natural field experiment.  We chose an office support 
position both because it is the most common occupation in the country and also because it is a 
relatively easy job to create.  In 2008 and 2009, office and administrative support jobs were the 
most common type of position to hold, accounting for over 13% of the workforce (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics).  It is possible, however, that office support positions attract fewer competitive 
types, compared for example to a sales position.  Whether the job type interacts with the gender 
gap is an important issue that remains unresolved.  Second, we explore job applications and not 
final acceptance of the job.  In this manner, we are observing a critical first step in the hiring 
process to learn more about gender preferences.  In as much as learning about the ultimate 
distribution of workers, we can say less because of this goal.
22 This represents a fruitful avenue 
for future research.
                                                           
22 However, recall that the gender distribution of our subjects interested by the job-ad that removed male-oriented 
language closely mirrors the actual gender distribution in the US workforce for this type of job , underscoring the 
importance of application patterns for realized labor force composition.
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 ad  ad
Job-seekers total (N) 6779 4239 2540 3598 3181
 in T1 1143 709 434 604 539
 in T2 1130 701 429 600 530
 in T3 1127 705 422 592 535
 in T4 1133 703 430 603 530
 in T5 1112 701 411 588 524
 in T6 1134 720 414 611 523
Job-applications T1-T6 (probability) 0.398 0.369 0.447 0.406 0.39
Women’s job-applications T1-T6  0.362 0.358 0.372 0.363 0.362
Men’s job-applications T1-T6  0.484 0.414 0.534 0.493 0.472
Words in questionnaire (mean) 217.9 214.2 222.8 116.7 337.8






minimal        
hourly wage





 team relative 
performance?
risk/uncertainty 
T1 & T2  15 15
T3 13.5 16.5 X
T4 12 18 X
T5 12 18 X
T6 13.5 16.5 X
Table 1: Characterization of compensation scheme treatments (T1-T6)








wage (per hour) 
application 
questionnaire
Atlanta 690 0.42 11 long
Boston 211 0.38 13 long
Chicago 624 0.47 10.25 short
Washington DC 435 0.34 13.5 short
Dallas 460 0.36 11 long
Denver 457 0.41 12 short
Houston 400 0.35 10 long
Los Angeles 501 0.39 11.5 short
Miami 344 0.35 10 long
NYC 517 0.33 12 short
Philadelphia 315 0.46 11.5 short
Phoenix 308 0.43 11 long
Portland 385 0.48 11.58 short
San Diego 404 0.41 11 long
San Francisco 364 0.38 14 short
Seattle 364 0.41 12.5 long
Table 3: Summary of locations where job ads were 
posted
Notes:  In each given city the median wage was collected from posted wages of 






treatment female male female male
T1 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.61
T2 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.58
T3 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.54
T4 0.30 0.34 0.28 0.64
T5 0.27 0.34 0.32 0.44
T6 0.40 0.47 0.40 0.53
T1 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.51
T2 0.40 0.60 0.48 0.58
T3 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.50
T4 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.51
T5 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.45
T6 0.33 0.36 0.28 0.47
Table 4: Application probabilities depending on gender and 
treatments
female-oriented job ad male-oriented job  ad
Notes:  Numbers show the application probabilities for women and men.
short    
questionnaire
















Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





-0.087*** -0.068* -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.070**
(0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017)
-0.117*** -0.147*** -0.104*** -0.144*** -0.090***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
-0.127*** -0.110*** -0.132*** -0.158*** -0.095***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
-0.068*** -0.105** -0.052** -0.036 -0.102***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.030) (0.218) (0.001)
0.106*** 0.124*** 0.065** 0.096*** 0.118***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.000)
0.022 0.020 -0.000 0.050 -0.011
(0.555) (0.723) (0.999) (0.316) (0.845)
0.070* 0.153*** -0.035 0.129** -0.003
(0.064) (0.009) (0.525) (0.011) (0.957)
0.003 -0.012 0.007 0.035 -0.030
(0.937) (0.836) (0.906) (0.505) (0.607)
0.012 0.044 -0.006 0.016 -0.012
(0.749) (0.445) (0.905) (0.751) (0.837)
City fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes
N 6779 2540 4239 3598 3181
T6  ×  male
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. differences in application 
probabilities. Omitted category= women in T1&T2. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 0 if 
subject is female. T1 & T2 = treatments with fixed hourly wages = $15. T3 = treatment in which compensation 
depends mildly on individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly wage = $13.5, if she outperforms a 
competitor hourly wage = $16.5. T4 = treatment in which compensation depends strongly on individual relative 
performance. If subject underperforms hourly wage = $12, if she outperforms a competitor hourly wage = $18. T5 = 
treatment in which compensation depends on relative team performance. If team underperforms hourly wage = $12, 
if team outperforms a competing team hourly wage = $18. T6 = treatment in which compensation depends on 
uncertainty, hourly wage is either $13.5 or $16.5.






T3 ×  male
T4  ×  male






Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable male in T1&T2 T3  ×  male T4  ×  male T5  ×  male T6  ×  male
-0.024 0.060 0.112** 0.058 0.148***
(0.324) (0.123) (0.049) (0.224) (0.005)
-0.049 0.061 0.067 0.026 -0.066
(0.453) (0.628) (0.601) (0.749) (0.522)
0.019 0.030 0.036* -0.045 0.011
(0.112) (0.249) (0.096) (0.104) (0.614)
-0.003* 0.006** 0.004 -0.003 0.002
(0.080) (0.015) (0.239) (0.164) (0.582)
0.301 -1.180** -1.774*** -0.205 -1.732***
(0.262) (0.050) (0.008) (0.790) (0.006)
R-squared 0.379 0.216 0.481 0.463 0.525
Notes:  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. N=16; i.e. one observation per city. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
Regression estimated with robust standard errors . All variables are on city level. Market wage is estimated for jobs 
comparable to our advertised job on same online job board. Unemployment rate = the unemployment rate in the 
corresponding city one month before the job was advertised. Job supply = Number of subjects who signalled interest 
in our job advertisements divided by number of advertised comparable jobs on same online job board. Short 
application questionnaire = 1 if questionnaire is short, 0 if questionnaire is long.










Figure 1: Experimental Design (two-step method). 
 
Figure 2: Application patterns depending on treatment and gender. 
Notes: T1&T2= fixed wages either team (T1) or no team work(T2), T3= base wage +22% 
bonus depending on individual relative performance, T4= base wage +50% bonus 
depending on individual relative performance, T5= base wage +50% bonus depending on 

























































T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T641
Figure 3 (left): Application pattern for the male-oriented job ad. 
Figure 4 (right): Application pattern for the female-oriented job ad. 
Notes: T1&T2= fixed wages either team(T1) or no team work(T2), T3= base wage 
+22% bonus depending on individual relative performance, T4= base wage +50% 
bonus depending on individual relative performance, T5= base wage +50% bonus 
depending on team relative performance, T6= base wage +22% bonus depending on 
















T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
male-oriented job ad female-oriented job ad42
 
Figure 5: Market wages and gender differences in willingness to apply to competitive 
workplaces.  
Notes: The y-axis shows marginal effects of the T4 × male interaction for each corresponding city; i.e., the 
gender difference-in-differences between a fixed-wage job and the same job with compensation 
depending heavily on individual performance. Positive numbers indicate a gender gap because women 
disproportionally avoid applying to competitive workplaces. City names are abbreviated.
 
 
Figure 6: Probability job-applicant is rated as able.
Notes: Lines connect mean female to mean male rated ability. T1&T2=fixed wages either team or no
team work, T3= base wage +22% bonus depending on individual relative performance, T4= base wage 
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A1. Male job advertisement 
 
Posting Category: admin/office jobs 
Title: Seeking Sports News Assistant  
 
The {insert affiliation} is seeking a {insert city} -area administrative assistant to help gather information 
on sports stories in the {insert city} region. While the {insert affiliation} is based in Chicago, we have a 
satellite project in {insert city}. The assistant will provide us with up-to-date information on local news 
and views on basketball, football, baseball, soccer, Nascar, golf, tennis, hockey, and other sports. 
 
Responsibilities for the position include reading local sports-related news coverage (pro-, semi-pro, and 
college), and preparing short reports. The successful candidate will also be comfortable with typical 
administrative duties – light correspondence, proofreading, filing, email and phone communication, etc. 
 
 If you are interested, please email us your CV or resume, attention: Name A (gender not recognizable) 
 




Compensation: Hourly    
Location: {insert city} 
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A2. Female job advertisement 
 
Posting Category: admin/office jobs 
Title: Administrative Assistant 
 
The {insert affiliation} is hiring a {insert city} -area administrative assistant to help gather information on 
a variety of local news issues in the {insert city} region. While the {insert affiliation} is based in Chicago, 
we have a satellite project in {insert city}. The assistant will provide us with up-to-date information on 
community events, arts and culture, business, entertainment, policy issues, crime, and other stories. 
 
Responsibilities for the position include seeking out, reading, and summarizing local news stories and 
preparing short reports. The successful candidate will also be comfortable with typical administrative 
duties – light correspondence, proofreading, filing, email and phone communication, etc. 
 
 If you are interested, please email us your CV or resume, attention: Name B (gender not recognizable) 
 




Compensation: Hourly    





B. Response to job-seekers who replied to job advertisements (for T1-T6) 
 
Thank you for your interest in the position. 
 
We are sending this general first response to interested applicants. We apologize if you have any 
unanswered questions. If you still have questions about the position, please send them, along with your 
responses to the enclosed interview questions, to complete your application. 
 
 
{for T1} First, a little more information about the job: As the work is best done in teams, you will be 
paired with one co-worker. We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality information from you is 
important. The position pays $15/hr.  
 
{for T2}  First, a little more information about the job: We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality 
information from you is important. The position pays $15/hr. 
 
{for T3}  First, a little more information about the job: We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality 
information from you is important. You will be paired with one other person we are also currently hiring 
into the same position. The base wage for the position is $13.50/hr plus a bonus, which translates to an 
additional $3/hr, if you perform better than this co-worker. Thus, the wage is either $13.50/hr or 
$16.50/hr, depending on which of you does best. 
 
{for T4} First, a little more information about the job: We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality 
information from you is important. You will be paired with one other person we are also currently hiring 
into the same position. The base wage for the position is $12/hr plus a bonus, which translates to an 
additional $6/hr, if you perform better than this co-worker. Thus, the wage is either $12/hr or $18/hr, 
depending on which of you does best.
23 
 
{for T5} First, a little more information about the job: As the work is best done in teams, you will be 
paired with one co-worker. We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality information from you is 
important. The wage for the position is $12/hr plus a bonus, which translates to an additional $6/hr, if 
your team performs better than another team. Thus, the wage is either $12/hr or $18/hr, depending on 
which pair does best. 
 
{for T6} First, a little more information about the job: We have frequent deadlines, and timely quality 
information from you is important as it is the basis for journal publication. The base wage for the 
position is $13.50/hr, plus an hourly bonus of $3/hr if your assistance contributes to the publication of 
articles. 
                                                           





If you are interested, please answer the attached interview questions with a few sentences each, and 
return them to us. Please also include your CV or resume (if not already sent to us), and any remaining 











C1. Short interview questionnaire 
 







C2. Long interview questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions with a few sentences each.  
How would you describe yourself? 
Please write a few sentences describing why you are interested in this position. 
How would you describe your ideal work environment? 
Please tell us about a major problem you have recently encountered, or a challenge you have       






Appendix B: Tables A-F and Figure A  
 
 
Model (1) (2) (3)























City fixed effects? yes yes yes
N 6779 2540 4239
T6  ×  male
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. differences in application 
probabilities. Omitted category= w omen in T1. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 0 if subject 
is female. T1 & T2 = treatments w ith fixed hourly w ages = $15. T3 = treatment in w hich compensation depends mildly 
on individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $13.5, if she outperforms a competitor 
hourly w age = $16.5. T4 = treatment in w hich compensation depends strongly on individual relative performance. If 
subject underperforms hourly w age = $12, if she outperforms a competitor hourly w age = $18. T5 = treatment in w hich 
compensation depends on relative team performance. If team underperforms hourly w age = $12, if team outperforms a 
competing team hourly w age = $18. T6 = treatment in w hich compensation depends on uncertainty, hourly w age is 
either $13.5 or $16.5.







T3 ×  male
T4  ×  male
T5 ×  male
T2
T2 ×  male48  
Model (1) (2) (3)





























City fixed effects? yes yes yes
N 6070 2269 3801
T3 ×  male
T5 ×  male
T6 ×  male
Job experience
T3
T4 ×  male











Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. differences in application 
probabilities. Omitted category= w omen in T1&T2. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 0 if 
subject is female. T1 & T2 = treatments w ith fixed hourly w ages = $15. T3 = treatment in w hich compensation depends 
mildly on individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $13.5, if she outperforms a 
competitor hourly w age = $16.5. T4 = treatment in w hich compensation depends strongly on individual relative 
performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $12, if she outperforms a competitor hourly w age = $18. T5 = 
treatment in w hich compensation depends on relative team performance. If team underperforms hourly w age = $12, if 
team outperforms a competing team hourly w age = $18. T6 = treatment in w hich compensation depends on uncertainty, 










Model (1) (2) (3)



















City fixed effects? yes yes yes
N 6779 2540 4239
T6  ×  female
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. differences in application 
probabilities. Omitted category= men in T1&T2. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 0 if 
subject is female.  T1 & T2 = treatments w ith fixed hourly w ages = $15. T3 = treatment in w hich compensation 
depends mildly on individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $13.5, if she 
outperforms a competitor hourly w age = $16.5. T4 = treatment in w hich compensation depends strongly on 
individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $12, if she outperforms a competitor 
hourly w age = $18. T5 = treatment in w hich compensation depends on relative team performance. If team 
underperforms hourly w age = $12, if team outperforms a competing team hourly w age = $18. T6 = treatment in 
w hich compensation depends on uncertainty, hourly w age is either $13.5 or $16.5.
Table C: Probability of job application, omitted category is men in 






T3 ×  female
T4  ×  female






Model (1) (2) (3)



















City fixed effects? yes yes yes
N 1010 444 566
T6  ×  male
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. differences in application 
probabilities. Omitted category= w omen in T1&T2. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 0 
if subject is female. T1 & T2 = treatments w ith fixed hourly w ages = $15. T3 = treatment in w hich compensation 
depends mildly on individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $13.5, if she 
outperforms a competitor hourly w age = $16.5. T4 = treatment in w hich compensation depends strongly on 
individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $12, if she outperforms a competitor 
hourly w age = $18. T5 = treatment in w hich compensation depends on relative team performance. If team 
underperforms hourly w age = $12, if team outperforms a competing team hourly w age = $18. T6 = treatment in 
w hich compensation depends on uncertainty, hourly w age is either $13.5 or $16.5.
 Table D: Probability of job application restricted to San Franciso, 






T3 ×  male
T4  ×  male




Model (1) (2) (3)



















City fixed effects? yes yes yes
N 5769 2096 3673
T6  ×  male
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. differences in application 
probabilities. Omitted category= w omen in T1&T2. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 0 
if subject is female. T1 & T2 = treatments w ith fixed hourly w ages = $15. T3 = treatment in w hich compensation 
depends mildly on individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $13.5, if she 
outperforms a competitor hourly w age = $16.5. T4 = treatment in w hich compensation depends strongly on 
individual relative performance. If subject underperforms hourly w age = $12, if she outperforms a competitor 
hourly w age = $18. T5 = treatment in w hich compensation depends on relative team performance. If team 
underperforms hourly w age = $12, if team outperforms a competing team hourly w age = $18. T6 = treatment in 
w hich compensation depends on uncertainty, hourly w age is either $13.5 or $16.5.
 Table E: Probability of job application restricted to cities         






T3 ×  male
T4  ×  male




Model  (1)  (2)
Dependent Variable  Ability to perform job Applicants confidence
0.042  0.024
(0.239)  (0.497) 
-0.085**  -0.020
(0.024)  (0.511) 
-0.044  0.004
(0.139)  (0.873) 
0.017  -0.117***
(0.749)  (0.010) 
0.172***  0.036





Rater fixed effects?  yes  yes
N  1600  1600
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Coefficients present average marginal effect, i.e. 
differences in the probability rater judges applicant to be able to perform task (model 1) 
or that applicant perceives herself as confident (model 2). Omitted category= men in 
T1&T2. P-values in parenthesis. Robust standard errors used. Male = 1 if subject is 
male, 0 = subject is female. T1 & T2 = treatments with fixed wages and hourly wage = 
$15. T3 = treatment in which compensation depends on individual relative performance. 
If subject underperforms hourly wage = $13.5, if she outperforms a competitor hourly
wage = $16.5. T4 = treatment in which compensation depends on individual relative 
performance. If subject underperforms hourly wage = $12, if she outperforms a 
competitor hourly wage = $18.  Confidence: 0 = not confident, 1 = somewhat 
confident, 2= confident, 3 = very confident. Ability: 0 = not able to perform job, 1 = 
somewhat able, 2 = able, 3 = very able.
Table F: Rating of applications (logit)
T3 
T4 
T3 ×  female 





Figure A: Application patterns on city level.  
Notes: m=male, f=female. T1&T2=fixed wages either team or no team work, T3= base wage +22% 
bonus depending on individual relative performance, T4= base wage +50% bonus depending on 
individual relative performance, T5+ base wage +50% bonus depending on team relative 
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